In Parts VI and VII we looked at past and projected sea level rise. It is clear that the sea level has risen over the last hundred years, and it’s clear that with more warming sea level will rise some more. The uncertainties (given a specific global temperature increase) are more around how much more ice will melt than how much the ocean will expand (warmer water expands). Future sea level rise will clearly affect some people in the future, but very differently in different countries and regions. This article considers the US.
A month or two ago, via a link from a blog, I found a paper which revised upwards a current calculation (or average of such calculations) of damage due to sea level rise in 2100 in the US. Unfortunately I can’t find the paper, but essentially the idea was people would continue moving to the ocean in ever increasing numbers, and combined with possible 1m+ sea level rise (see Part VI & VII) the cost in the US would be around $1TR (I can’t remember the details but my memory tells me this paper concluded costs were 3x previous calculations due to this ever increasing population move to coastal areas – in any case, the exact numbers aren’t important).
Two examples that I could find (on global movement of people rather than just in the US), Nicholls 2011:
..This threatened population is growing significantly (McGranahan et al., 2007), and it will almost certainly increase in the coming decades, especially if the strong tendency for coastward migration continues..
And Anthoff et al 2010
Fifthly, building on the fourth point, FUND assumes that the pattern of coastal development persists and attracts future development. However, major disasters such as the landfall of hurricanes could trigger coastal abandonment, and hence have a profound influence on society’s future choices concerning coastal protection as the pattern of coastal occupancy might change radically.
A cycle of decline in some coastal areas is not inconceivable, especially in future worlds where capital is highly mobile and collective action is weaker. As the issue of sea-level rise is so widely known, disinvestment from coastal areas may even be triggered without disasters..
I was struck by the “trillion dollar problem” paper and the general issues highlighted in other papers. The future cost of sea level rise in the US is not just bad, it’s extremely expensive because people will keep moving to the ocean.
Why are people moving to the coast?
So here is an obvious take on the subject that doesn’t need an IAM (integrated assessment model).. Perhaps lots of people missed the IPCC TAR (third assessment report) in 2001. Perhaps anthropogenic global warming fears had not reached a lot of the population. Maybe it didn’t get a lot of media coverage. But surely no could have missed Al Gore’s movie. I mean, I missed it from choice, but how could anyone in rich countries not know about the discussion?
So anyone since 2006 (arbitrary line in the sand) who bought a house that is susceptible to sea level rise is responsible for their own loss that they incur around 2100. That is, if the worst fears about sea level rise play out, combined with more extreme storms (subject of a future article) which create larger ocean storm surges, their house won’t be worth much in 2100.
Now, barring large increases in life expectancy, anyone who bought a house in 2005 will almost certainly be dead in 2100. There will be a few unlucky centenarians.
Think of it as an estate tax. People who have expensive ocean-front houses will pass on their now worthless house to their children or grandchildren. Some people love the idea of estate taxes – in that case you have a positive. Some people hate the idea of estate taxes – in that case strike it up as a negative. And, drawing a long bow here, I suspect a positive correlation between concern about climate change and belief in the positive nature of estate taxes, so possibly it’s a win-win for many people.
Now onto infrastructure.
From time to time I’ve had to look at depreciation and official asset life for different kinds of infrastructure and I can’t remember seeing one for 100 years. 50 years maybe for civil structures. I’m definitely not an expert. That said, even if the “official depreciation” gives something a life of 50 years, much is still being used 150 years later – buildings, railways, and so on.
So some infrastructure very close to the ocean might have to be abandoned. But it will have had 100 years of useful life and that is pretty good in public accounting terms.
Why is anyone building housing, roads, power stations, public buildings, railways and airports in the US in locations that will possibly be affected by sea level rise in 2100? Maybe no one is.
So the cost of sea level rise for 2100 in the US seems to be a close to zero cost problem.
These days, if a particular area is recognized as a flood plain people are discouraged from building on it and no public infrastructure gets built there. It’s just common sense.
Some parts of New Orleans were already below sea level when Hurricane Katrina hit. Following that disaster, lots of people moved out of New Orleans to a safer suburb. Lots of people stayed. Their problems will surely get worse with a warmer climate and a higher sea level (and also if storms gets stronger – subject of a future article). But they already had a problem. Infrastructure was at or below sea level and sufficient care was not taken of their coastal defences.
A major problem that happens overnight, or over a year, is difficult to deal with. A problem 100 years from now that affects a tiny percentage of the land area of a country, even with a large percentage (relatively speaking) of population living there today, is a minor problem.
Perhaps the costs of recreating current threatened infrastructure a small distance inland are very high, and the existing infrastructure would in fact have lasted more than 100 years. In that case, people who believe Keynesian economics might find the economic stimulus to be a positive. People who don’t think Keynesian economics does anything (no multiplier effect) except increase taxes, or divert productive resources into less productive resources will find it be a negative. Once again, drawing a long bow, I see a correlation between people more concerned about climate change also being more likely to find Keynesian economics a positive. Perhaps again, there is a win-win.
In summary, given the huge length of time to prepare for it, US sea level rise seems like a minor planning inconvenience combined with an estate tax.
Articles in this Series
Impacts – II – GHG Emissions Projections: SRES and RCP
Impacts – III – Population in 2100
Impacts – IV – Temperature Projections and Probabilities
Impacts – V – Climate change is already causing worsening storms, floods and droughts
Impacts – VI – Sea Level Rise 1
Impacts – VII – Sea Level 2 – Uncertainty
References
Planning for the impacts of sea level rise, RJ Nicholls, Oceanography (2011)
The economic impact of substantial sea-level rise, David Anthoff et al, Mitig Adapt Strateg Glob Change (2010)
SOD wrote: “These days, if a particular area is recognized as a flood plain people are discouraged from building on it and no public infrastructure gets built there. It’s just common sense.”
Unfortunately, common sense is often forgotten when governments respond to the needs of special interests. In general, no one can afford to build anywhere they can’t obtain insurance against flooding. However, the US government has been subsidizing flood insurance in risky areas, so that everyone can have access to “affordable” insurance. They stopped that practice a few years ago and the insurance rates skyrocketed for those owning vulnerable property near coasts and rivers. Citizens from those areas successfully lobbied to restore the subsidy after a single year.
And our government provides relief funds to help communities rebuild after flooding. After hurricane Sandy caused massive losses in New Jersey and New York (second most expensive US hurricane), a few areas were abandoned, but most homeowners were provided funds to rebuild in the same area. In some vulnerable places, the main floor needed to be raised higher off the ground and/or strengthened before people were allowed to rebuild. Many waited a long time for rebuilding rules to be finalized before receiving funds. I’ve also seen the hardest hit areas of New Orleans (Ninth Ward) and they are rebuilding houses there on pillars that place lowest floor at second floor height. It is a mistake to assume that the government is pursuing policies that will force citizens living near the ocean to adapt to rising sea level. Removing insurance subsidies and forcing disaster victim to use relief funds to rebuild only in safe locations is very challenging.
https://encrypted-tbn1.gstatic.com/images?q=tbn:ANd9GcSvcqL-CajMtWQ2xPnP8yLnWgWnYj9kvcB35Rnr1iZJJw0grvf6
“After hurricane Sandy caused massive losses in New Jersey and New York (second most expensive US hurricane)”
Are you implying that Sandy would never have happened if not for our CO2 emissions?
Sandy wasnt even a hurricane when it hit land.
The number of hurricane hits on the US is the lowest it’s been since the Civil War. Yet you people keep saying there will be more and more intense hurricanes.
Another in a long list of failed predictions.
Richard wrote: “Are you implying that Sandy would never have happened if not for our CO2 emissions?”
I didn’t say so, did I? I used Sandy to illustrate the folly of assuming US policy was reducing exposure to SLR.
I never said Sandy was connected to CO2, though I could say that all anthropogenic forcing might have contributed perhaps 5″ of SLR to a storm surge that reached 10 feet. (Please don’t put words in my mouth.)
Sandy had a central low-pressure typical of a Category III hurricane, slightly lower than ANY previous hurricane Atlantic hurricane north of Cape Hatteras. When it struck land, however, it was in the process of changing from a warm-core storm typical of a hurricane to a cold-core storm typical of a northeaster, so its power was distributed over a much wider area than normal for a hurricane. Except for wind speed, it had the attributes of a major hurricane, especially in damage. Saying it technically wasn’t a hurricane (which is debated) is highly misleading.
Richard said: “The number of hurricane hits on the US is the lowest it’s been since the Civil War. Yet you people keep saying there will be more and more intense hurricanes. Another in a long list of failed predictions.”
Possibly. The much-touted Pause ended with the recent El Nino (as I liked to predict before it happened) and I can safely predict the current pause in hurricanes will end soon too. The long-term average is a little greater than 1 hurricane strike per year. In 2016, Hurricane Matthew missed hitting Florida with as a Category IV (!) storm by 11 miles (moving parallel to the coast) and did hit South Carolina as a Category I hurricane – if you believe Wikipedia. Bonnie also missed being a Category 1 strike by a few hours and the earliest on record. Since 1970, when satellites allowed us to consistently identify essentially all Atlantic hurricanes, the number of Atlantic hurricanes and major Atlantic hurricanes has actually risen modestly, but not statistically significantly. (The 65-year AMO is also supposed to be modulate hurricanes). I couldn’t find an up-to-date graph with the data for the last few years, so I’ll offer you the one below from Ryan Maue, who is frequently cited at WUTW. So, there have been a usual number or a slightly growing number of hurricanes and major hurricanes in the Atlantic. We have almost certainly been LUCKY in the past decade, and luck doesn’t last. We were unlucky in 2005, and it didn’t last. Neither side should be exaggerating the importance of fluctuations without clear trends or how soon any change will arrive.
The consensus opinion of experts (not “we people”) say that we will experience fewer (due to increased wind sheer), but stronger (due to higher SSTs) hurricanes a half-century or so from now. I’m personally somewhat skeptical about how much stronger “stronger” will be. The correlation between hurricane wind speed and SST shows that once SST is above a critical threshold, wind speed increases only modestly, if at all, with SST. The author, Pat Michaels, is a notorious skeptic. The paper has only nine citations in Google Scholar, but none has a title claiming to contradict his conclusion.
file:///Users/experimenter/Downloads/94127.pdf
Frank,
I will be writing about projections on extreme storms, but as a taster, here is SREX, ch3, p.160:
and p. 162
Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation, Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2012)
SOD: Very informative. I wrote and deleted some simplistic thoughts about hurricanes being powered by the temperature difference between the surface and tropopause, but reading a good summary if far more useful than speculation. Thanks.
If I had the resources, I’d ask how SSTs along a storm track influence the probability that a storm transitions from a lower category storm to a higher category storm. Suppose – after traveling over open 27 degC water for 24 h (or 48 h) – a Category 1 hurricane has a 25% chance of becoming Category 2, a 50% chance of remaining Category 1 and a 25% chance of down-grading to a Tropical Storm. Now what happens at higher temperatures and lower temperatures. And with stronger storms. I think this approaches the key question more directly: What is the relationship between SST and intensification? Not what is the relationship between current SST and current wind. (Perhaps this has been done and the lack of publicity provides the answer.)
“Hurricane Matthew missed hitting Florida with as a Category IV (!) storm by 11 miles (moving parallel to the coast) and did hit South Carolina as a Category I hurricane ”
Of course, with all cycles, a low point is replaced by a high point. Perfectly normal.
Of course, your cherry picked 5″ is pulled out from the sky. No mathematical or empirical evidence to suggest ANY affects from AGW on Sandy.
What I found comical about Matthew was when the computer models told us what it was going to do when it was south of Jamaica. NOT ONE model got the eventual trajectory correct. Remember when it was just past Florida they were saying models predicted it would circle around and restrike Florida?
Hence computer models cant predict such events more than one day in advance.
Richard wrote: “The number of hurricane hits on the US is the lowest it’s been since the Civil War. Yet you people keep saying there will be more and more intense hurricanes.
Frank replied: ““Hurricane Matthew missed hitting Florida with as a Category IV (!) storm by 11 miles (moving parallel to the coast) and did hit South Carolina as a Category I hurricane ”
Richard replied: “Of course, with all cycles, a low point is replaced by a high point. Perfectly normal.”
Frank continues: If you knew all of the time that a low point would be followed by a “high point”, why did you waste your time and our time discussing the low number of recent hurricane strikes on the US. You weren’t trying to mislead anyone with that information, were you? The same way alarmists tried to mislead us about 2005?
And please don’t say you mentioned the lack of hurricane strikes because it illustrates that Atlantic hurricanes are becoming rarer. I’ve already posted data from a skeptic that shows this is wrong.
Perhaps it would make sense to ASK: “Doesn’t the recent absence of hurricanes strikes on the US mean that the IPCC’s predictions of more hurricanes is wrong?”
Richard also wrote: “Of course, your cherry picked 5″ is pulled out from the sky. No mathematical or empirical evidence to suggest ANY affects from AGW on Sandy.”
How about a respectful question?: “Did you [Frank] have some reason for stating that AGW contributed about 5″ of SLR before Sandy struck? I [Richard] don’t believe that AGW had ANY effect on Sandy, including SLR.”
If you look at the graph of SLR in Wikipedia, you’ll see that SLR slowed dramatically about 7000 years ago. If you calculate the slope since then, you’ll find that the rate of rise was about 3 m over 70 centuries or 0.04 m/century or 4 cm/century. This is well below the 20th century rate of 17 cm/century. You can detect an even lower rate of rise over the last 4 and 2 millennia. So, 20th century sea level rise is abnormal for the Holocene (once all the ice remaining from the last ice age melted). So 20th-century SLR was probably cause by warming. Since sea level began rising before the 20th century, it presumably was a slow response to the end of the LIA. Since 1950 (when most warming has occurred), but not before, scientists think GHGs were responsible for at least half of GW. Given the reality of radiative forcing by GHGs and my personal lowest estimate for ECS of 1 K/doubling, several inches of SLR was probably due to GHG-mediated warming. Which is trivial given 3 foot tides, a 10 foot storm surge and waves over 10 feet.
Our host and many commenters here are familiar with the propaganda from both sides of the debate. Propaganda isn’t interesting; reliable information is. In this comments section, our host quotes large sections from the SREX showing that some climate scientists are skeptical that AGW will increase the strength of hurricanes. That’s valuable information that wasn’t publicized. In fact, the SPM for AR5 now characterizes an increase in hurricanes as “more likely than not” in some basins and down from “likely”. And they no longer provide an official definition for “more likely than not”, a phrase I thought they had abandoned. So the IPCC appears to no longer be taking a clear position on whether the number or intensity of hurricanes is likely to increase.
Frank, just a note that J. Richard Wakefield is no longer with us (except in spirit), see my earlier comment
In the USA, it’s a rather radical concept to force people to move. But, it’s been an ongoing process for economic reasons since the beginning. People move to jobs; people move away from lack of jobs. It’s happened to rural America; it’s happened to the rust belt, including coastal cities in the rust belt.
The biggest threat to western coastal cities is not from climate change, but from active tectonics. When will the next one happen? How many people will be killed? How much of the cities will be destroyed?
Yet not one peep from you climate change cultists about demanding people move away from active tectonic zones.
Oh, they’re more than welcome to move here to tornado alley.
SoD,
Isn’t it amazing that you can simultaneously be a “climate change cultist” and a “climate d—-r”? 🙂
Maybe the etiquette for the site should include a ban on phrases like “you people”. But it might be a bit hard to write a clear rule. 🙂
The tsunami following the next big earthquake on the Cascadia Fault will almost certainly be America’s worst natural disaster, similar to the Japanese earthquake. Fortunately, many fewer people live there than in Japan. Have you been to the Pacific Northwest to see what action they have taken? Yet that risk could be hundreds of years in the future. California has been building earthquake resistant structures for decades now and learned from how modern structures have survived or failed in recent earthquakes. When the Big One hits Southern California or the Bay Area, we will see how well they did.
We haven’t taken any effective action about coming climate change – whatever that may be. It will be global and continuous and therefore potentially more important than single localized catastrophes. However, I’m not sure effective action is possible or worth the cost.
“We haven’t taken any effective action about coming climate change – whatever that may be. ”
I find it amusing that the only projections of the future are those that are the most pessimistic. If anything a warmer world with more CO2 means shorter milder winders. Not as hot summers. Longer growing season, with faster growing crops. Would be quite nice to have 2 growing sessions per year like we had in the Medieval Warm Period.
Of course, the solar scientists could be right and Cycle 25-26 brings on a 30-50 year cold cycle. That happens hundreds of millions could starve from crop failures.
JCH,
Good example. Likewise, if we look at 1900 almost half the population worked in agriculture. In 2000, this was about 3%.
We could see this as an awful example of people being forced to move by economics and far better if policies to stop this had been implemented. (Obviously I don’t).
By comparison a very small sliver of land on the coast that possibly ends up underwater at the end of this century – during which time of course unimaginable changes will have taken place in the economic and social fabric of the US – seems like a small issue.
Note that I said “by comparison”. Moving from an agricultural to an industrial to a services/IT/industrial economy caused heart-breaking changes for many Americans. Losing a small sliver of coastal land will no doubt be heart-breaking for many 21st century Americans. But it seems like a minor issue compared with challenges of the last 100 years and the upcoming challenges of the next 100 years.
It’s a personal perspective.
SoD – yes, early American families, both sides of mine arrived around 1620, have either migrated or stayed put many many times, with variable results. The branch of my father’s family that stayed in Virginia disappeared with the Civil War. They originally arrived in Baltimore. This was basic pattern: England to Baltimore, Maryland; Baltimore to Virginia’s Shenandoah Valley, then a wilderness, there is a waterway and a frontier fort there that bear my family’s name; Shenandoah to North Carolina; North Carolina to Tennessee; Tennessee to Missouri; Missouri to the Dakotas; Dakotas to Texas.
My son is now a resident physician at Johns Hopkins in Baltimore, a coastal city that appears to be losing significant population.
“have either migrated or stayed put many many times”
This is an important perspective to retain.
On an individual basis, given the wide range of climate regimes across the country, a migrating individual experiences self induced climate change much larger than what might expect from CO2.
And humans over time have migrated to nearly every climate regime around the earth.
Okies. OK emptied out because of the draught and poor land management
“That is, if the worst fears about sea level rise play out, combined with more extreme storms (subject of a future article) which create larger ocean storm surges, their house won’t be worth much in 2100.”
Yet Al Gore owns a house on the ocean…
On the ocean? No. It’s not even close.
Lots of rich liberal people who accept the myth of massive sea level rise own beach front property.
Sea levels have varied in the past. A warmer atmosphere and warmer oceans, particularly warmer oceans, will melt vast amounts of ice both on Greenland and Antarctica. The dynamics of how fast that could happen this time are not well known, and your claims, like the relative elevation of Al Gore’s house versus current future sea level, are not very well informed.
Your claim of more extreme storms is unfounded. There is no evidence of any increase in storm frequency, nor storm intensity anywhere on the planet.
In 2005 you people predicted there would be more cat 5 Hurricanes hitting the US. The exact opposite has happened. Not one Cat 5 has hit the US in 12 years. In fact, the entire Hurricane frequency has gone down.
SOD has a recent article on storms, floods and droughts and he makes a case that its anything but certain that there are worsening storms, flood, and droughts from a global perspective. He probably shouldn’t be lumped in with a category called “you people”.
Yet the actual science says otherwise:
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v491/n7424/abs/nature11575.html
http://notrickszone.com/2013/12/06/in-the-models-only-leading-german-experts-find-no-statistical-increase-in-storm-frequency-or-intensity/#sthash.kJcWJduS.dpbs
“There is currently no firm evidence that temperature variability has or will increase because questions have been raised about the methods used to reach this conclusion. ”
http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/8/4/041001
“Although the hydrological cycle may increase in intensity, it does so at the expense of its ability to do work, such as powering large-scale atmospheric circulation or fueling more very intense storms.”
http://science.sciencemag.org/content/347/6221/540.full
J. Richard Wakefield,
From time to time commenters show up armed with huge self-confidence, determined to add more comments than all other commenters combined and impute all kinds of imaginary ideas to particular people writing here.
Such commenters also display the characteristic of never actually acknowledging any mistake in imputing such imaginary ideas.
Attempting to overwhelm the comment section and not actually engaging with other people will lead to me exercising my capricious right to moderate and ban. It is exercised rarely. I think the all-time list is so far under 10 people, but my regret on each of them is I didn’t ban them sooner.
Please read the Etiquette.
I’m engaging. I’m not being insulting. I’m trying to provide balance to the discussion by presenting science which some people here dont want to acknowledge exists. You’d ban me because I do that?
J. Richard Wakefield
You claim imaginary positions for others, argue against them and fail to acknowledge it when it was pointed out.
Given you can’t see it and seem to want to post more comments than everyone else combined I think your work here is done.
You can retire triumphant, joining the select pantheon of greats, knowing we couldn’t bear the relentless light you shone on our confused ideas. History at least will record your efforts.
There is a 100% chance that Sea Levels will reach 6-9 meters higher than today given that Greenland melts during Interglacial Periods and Sea Levels Normally reach 6-9 meters higher. Just like NYC is normally under 1 mile of Ice during Glacial Periods. It’s like clockwork. There is a huge possibility that Sea Lelvels will reach 20 meters higher than today given that this Interglacial is very similar to Marine Isotope Stage 11 with regards to Orbital variations known as Milankovitch Cycle.
Folks, predicting that Sea Levels are going to rise this Interglacial is like predicting Summer is not over in July.
Dang. My reply to this appeared down thread. No doubt my fault.
” There is a huge possibility that Sea Lelvels will reach 20 meters higher than today ”
When, in 20,000 years?
Steve: Maximum summer irradiation of northern polar regions occurred during the Holocene Climate Optimum about 6-8 millennia ago. If the Greenland Ice Sheet were going to melt during this cycle (without the assistance of aGHGs), I would have thought it would have happened then. Since that time summer radiation in northern polar regions has fallen and global temperature along with it (with the exception of some warmer periods, MWP, RWP, MiWP). The Little Ice Age was supposedly the coldest time during the Holocene. So I wasn’t expecting a rebound in northern hemisphere temperature in the near future.
https://www.google.com/search?q=holocene+temperature&espv=2&biw=1164&bih=1079&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiX0-mPg57SAhXK4CYKHUfGAE4Q_AUIBigB
Do you have any references to support your contention?
“Why is anyone building housing, roads, power stations, public buildings, railways and airports in the US in locations that will possibly be affected by sea level rise in 2100? Maybe no one is.
So the cost of sea level rise for 2100 in the US seems to be a close to zero cost problem.
These days, if a particular area is recognized as a flood plain people are discouraged from building on it and no public infrastructure gets built there. It’s just common sense.”
Because humans are… human? It would be common sense not to build public or private infrastructure in flood plains, or coastal areas vulnerable to sea level rise. But it happens every day. You can only assume that this is a zero cost problem is you assume that humans are rational beings with perfect foresight.
I wish I could find this beautiful graph that indicates human behavior perfectly: it showed percentage of people who owned flood insurance in Louisiana. After every hurricane, people would flock to buy new insurance, and levels would peak. Then, it would slowly drop as people decided that buying insurance was a waste of money… so by the time the next hurricane came through, insurance levels would be low again.
Katrina is also a good example. Any given hurricane is going to cause X amount of damage, but X is going to be a function of local relative sea level, so damage = X(sea level). It is going to have interesting non-linearities: an inch might be the difference between topping a key levee and not, or flooding a subway line beyond the capacity of the pumps to handle it and not. Yeah, the defenses in New Orleans were sub-par, but they would have been sufficient for a weaker hurricane/lower sea level – conversely, better defenses might not suffice for a stronger hurricane/higher sea level. How much do you spend on defending a vulnerable city? When do you abandon it? How much risk are you willing to take? How much do you trust the politicians authorizing the defenses, the designers and planners, and the contractors who implement? It is a lot easier to plan for what a given location has seen historically, than to get people to plan for sea levels that will be 30 to 150 cm higher in the next 100 years.
Also, I think there may be different math for the depreciation of an individual piece of infrastructure, and the depreciation of a whole set of infrastructure. If you know your town is going to be abandoned in the year 2100, and your building degrades in 2070, do you rebuild or abandon? If you rebuild, well, you aren’t going to get 50 years out of it. If you abandon, then everyone who lives around you will suffer for living next to an abandoned building for 30 years.
Here’s links to two webpages of potential interest:
Another cost of sea level rise study: https://www.epa.gov/cira/climate-action-benefits-coastal-property
And here’s observed increases in nuisance flooding days: https://www.epa.gov/climate-indicators/climate-change-indicators-coastal-flooding
climatemusings,
I agree with your points about how people behave and measure risk.
Likewise people recognize that regardless of what the government says (“we won’t help you if you do that”), if enough people do the same discouraged activity they will get government action when disaster strikes.
I think it was Robert Lucas or Ed Prescott or Kydland or someone related who expounded on the economic idea using the example of the flood plain. People realize that the government will act anyway so go and build on the flood plain. Therefore, so some economists write, government policy often doesn’t work because people form expectations about future government actions.
My point isn’t that society, government or media can discourage people from moving to the coast.
My point is that the specific case of US sea level rise by 2100 should cause rational people today to give it a negligible future cost in terms of today’s policies.
That is, if someone builds the case (and many have) that climate change by 2100 will cause $X damage, and so imposing $Y/tonne of CO2 today provides good cost benefit, a sensible response is –
No the real cost is $X-$Z of damage, where $Z is US 2100 coastal damage.
Just about everyone who bought any property there before the very loud alarm bells were rung in every corner of the media will be dead in 2100. Their loss is zero. No one who moves there today, ignoring the loud warnings, should be expecting society to pay today to solve their future problem.
Other projected problems of future climate change require their own analysis. This is only looking at US sea level rise.
From Wikipedia:
“The Biggert–Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (Biggert-Waters) modified the [National Flood Insurance Program]. At the conclusion of 2011, as congress passed Biggert-Waters, the NFIP cumulative debt was over $17 billion.[6] A core principle of Biggert-Waters was to change the NFIP premiums to match actuarial risk-based premiums that better reflected the expected losses and real risk of flooding. These changes included removing discounts to many policies which were being sold below actual actuarial risk targets and eliminating “grandfathering” of older rates.[6][7]
In January 2014, the United States Senate passed the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014 (S. 1926; 113th Congress). This bill changed the process used to alter subsidized premiums and reinstated grandfathering of lower rates; effectively delaying the increases in flood insurance premiums to obtain risk-based premiums under Biggert-Waters and spreading the cost of the lost premiums over all of the remaining policy holders.[6][8][9]
The National Flood Insurance Program was $24 billion in debt at the beginning of 2014 as a result of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Sandy. The passage of the HFIAA described above has concerned insurance and environmental observers that the delay in implementation of actuarial rates will leave taxpayers exposed to additional losses.[7]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Flood_Insurance_Program
Steven Morris,
Sea level does not reached 6-9 meters higher than today during interglacials. I don’t think sea level has been that high since the end of the Pliocene. Greenland does not melt during interglacials. The idea that orbital parameters for this interglacial are similar to those during marine isotope stage 11 was due to a dating error for MIS 11 that has since been corrected. If you use Milankovitch cycles as a guide, it is hard to understand how we are still in an interglacial; in the past, whenever NH summer insolation has been as low as it is now, the Earth has either been in a glacial period or heading into one. If you actually want to look into such topics, there are interesting and readable papers by William Ruddiman.
” than to get people to plan for sea levels that will be 30 to 150 cm higher in the next 100 years.”
No one alive today will be around in 2100, so why worry?
No one alive today? Sarcasm? just in case you were actually serious, it’s only 83 years to 2100. Lots of people live longer than that. My mother was alive for 97 years and my father for 104. Absent some global catastrophe, life expectancy should increase in the next 83 years. Some people think it will increase a lot.
You and I wont be around then to know who was right.
Gotta say this is a particularly trivial analysis. Especially as people are having to pay for infrastructure protection and upgrades right now (think Miami).
Why are you all discussing 2100 like sea level rise suddenly happens between 2099 and 2100?
“No the real cost is $X-$Z of damage, where $Z is US 2100 coastal damage.”
It’s really not useful to think that all the costs happen in 2100
I think the failure here is that you haven’t actually looked at what sea level rise means other than as x mm/year or x mm by 2100. To actually assess if this is a problem, you need to know the varying risks as sea level rises. You need a detailed understanding of the risks of erosion, salinisation of aquifers, tidal surges etc.
Also to claim that infrastructure that is over 50 years old is worthless, ‘because depreciation’ is simply weird
And this is just bananas:
“A major problem that happens overnight, or over a year, is difficult to deal with. A problem 100 years from now that affects a tiny percentage of the land area of a country, even with a large percentage (relatively speaking) of population living there today, is a minor problem.”
This is possibly the most trivial analysis you have ever done. Especially given the number of detailed studies on it (Think Garnuat or Stern etc.)
Nathan,
I am considering costs up to 2100 (not costs from 2099 to 2100).
Of course, I am going to review the economic analyses by economists, but it seems that there is an assumption that is worth challenging, which does not get a mention.
Economists faithfully work out how much it will cost to move people away from the ocean as sea level rises and count it as an economic cost to be incurred *by someone*, even though the people moving there surely knew of the projected risk (99.9% of the ones who didn’t know of the projected risk when they made their decision will be deceased).
That doesn’t make sense to me, but of course I’m not an economist or a politician. Hence the article. Hopefully people can enlighten me on my error.
Well, perhaps start with the Stern and Garnaut reports. They are summary docs, with plenty of references for you.
I would also suggest starting at the other end; that is, what sort of effects sea level rise causes and whether they should be considered. There’s a lot of varying impacts from sea level rise that need to be considered beyond a simple mm/year number.
“even though the people moving there surely knew of the projected risk (99.9% of the ones who didn’t know of the projected risk when they made their decision will be deceased).”
But it’s impacting people now – so this idea that the impacts will be felt when we’re all dead is not true.
These two statements are inconsistent
:
“I am considering costs up to 2100 (not costs from 2099 to 2100).”
“(99.9% of the ones who didn’t know of the projected risk when they made their decision will be deceased)”
As the cost is being borne, now, by living people in some regions.
The largest wild card in sea level projections is the fate of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet, about which there are some very interesting issues. Even before global warming became an issue, Terrence Hughes, a prominent glaciologist, suggested that the WAIS was unstable. The WAIS has already receded dramatically throughout the Holocene and is only about 60% of the way towards a stable position. The corollary is that sea level rise from WAIS is attributable to us being in the Holocene (rather than present day climate policy) and, short of returning to glaciation, is something that we will have to adapt to, rather than hoping for success from Canutian imprecations.
Steve,
In Joint effects of storm surge and sea-level rise on US Coasts: new economic estimates of impacts, adaptation, and benefits of mitigation policy, James E. Neumann et al, Climatic Change (2015) the authors look at a number of scenarios including quite large sea level rise by 2100 (1.4m) and combine it with increases in extreme storms (to be covered I hope at a later date) to produce higher storm surges. They estimate the (undiscounted) cost of various scenarios.
They say:
[Emphasis added]
Not quite the point you were making on the west Antarctic ice sheet, but similar in principle.
One of their representative graphs:
Their set of graphs illustrate something interesting – unless you believe that 85-year economic forecasts combined with 85-year climate models are correct to within 20%, there isn’t any difference in cost due to sea level rise between any of the scenarios – and the scenarios vary widely.
And what are the costs of the most likely scenario of just 6 inches in 100 years and no change in severe weather events?
It’s certainly interesting that mitigation costs are similar to adaptation costs. It’s quite a coincidence. However, the mitigation leads to a host of other benefits as well, less pollution, slowing the change in ocean pH… and so on.
It also means that costs to be borne beyond 2100 are much lower (given there is a big delay between mitigation and the slowing of sea level rise).
Nathan Tetlaw wrote: “mitigation leads to a host of other benefits as well, less pollution, slowing the change in ocean pH… and so on.”
Yes, it does. But increased CO2 also leads to other benefits, such as more rapid plant growth, better drought tolerance, longer growing seasons, less extreme winter temperatures, etc.
Mitigation also leads to unintended harm. Many of the side benefits of mitigation are from reducing the unintended environmental harm resulting from fossil fuel use. But other energy sources also produce environmental harm: dead birds and bats from wind turbines, altered habitat due to dams, habitat destruction by building solar farms, radiation hazards from nuclear, pollution associated with battery production and disposal, etc.
Adaption also leads to side benefits, such as better resilience in the face of the natural disasters that will occur anyway.
We must not look at just one side of the ledger.
Nathan,
This is my reason for examining one point at a time. It’s somewhat slower, but I like it.
Nathan, time does not stop in 2100. Mitigation is much superior in the long run (and yes, Eli knows about Keynes)
Steve McIntyre.
You wrote: “The WAIS has already receded dramatically throughout the Holocene … sea level rise from WAIS is attributable to us being in the Holocene”.
Has sea level been rising throughout the Holocene? I was under the impression that it was at a maximum, somewhat higher than today, at about the time of the Holocene Optimum. Could you point me toward where I can get find good numbers on post-glacial termination sea levels?
Milke: If you look at the graph of SLR in Wikipedia, you’ll see that SLR slowed dramatically about 7000 years ago. If you calculate the slope since then, you’ll find that the rate of rise was about 3 m over 70 centuries or 0.04 m/century or 4 cm/century. This is well below the 20th century rate of 17 cm/century. You can detect, but not easily quantify, an even lower rate of rise over the last 4 and 2 millennia. So, 20th century sea level rise is abnormal for the Holocene (once all the ice remaining from the last ice age melted).
Looking at this graph, it is impossible to tell if sea level ever reached a maximum or a plateau. However, it is clear that the rate of change was low OVER MILLENNIA compared with the 20th-century. I would guess there was some fall during the LIA. Today, we are worried about the possibility of 1 m of SLR in the next century. That would be almost undetectable on this millennial scale graph. You may need persistent changes for centuries to leave conclusive geological evidence of SLR behind.
Nathan commented above on the “triviality” of the analysis.
Let’s assume for a moment that most of the cost comes closer to the end of the century (a separate comment on that later).
Now I attempt to illustrate my point more clearly with an extreme example..
Let’s suppose that the current economist calculated cost of US sea level rise by 2100 for a given scenario is $830BN.
Therefore, (and for simplicity ignoring both the discount rate and pure rate of social time preference), if payments of $9BN per year starting in 2017 can completely mitigate this sea level rise and the consequent cost it is worth doing.
So, the citizenry pay $9BN per year and thereby create a net benefit. Instead of incurring an $830BN cost, we have paid $9BN x 83 = $747BN and saved the economy a considerable sum.
So far so good.
If instead that $9BN per year was nowhere near enough to completely mitigate this sea level rise the US should do nothing (assuming there is no inbetween option). From an economist’s point of view, quite sensible.
Now imagine that there is a huge rush to the ocean. Something in the air. It’s just too good to resist. Our coastal population (in the threatened areas) will increase by 10x by 2100 compared with the previous analysis.
Our careful economists recalculate the cost and conclude that overall the cost by 2100 will reach $8.3TR (I don’t imagine it will scale exactly, just for the sake of simplicity).
Now our economists conclude that paying $90BN per year is a very worthwhile sum if it would mitigate the sea level rise completely.
This would only cost $7.5TR, saving $800BN.
Media headlines tell the citizenry the true cost of climate change just in the US and just from sea level is $7.5TR ! (And there should justifiably be more than one exclamation mark).
So yes it is technically correct to call it a real cost. It isn’t in fact zero. (I was trying to make a point). But here is my point:
If you ask today’s citizens to pay a current cost to mitigate a future cost that will affect few living today, and actually will mitigate a future cost that is only incurred by people have been risk-lovers/foolhardy against the advice of everyone knowledgeable on the subject – what will today’s citizens say?
1. Good economic analysis, it makes sense.
or
2. Why? They are getting themselves into this damn mess.
And the promised second point – where in time the costs are incurred.
1. Costs rise disproportionately compared to sea level.
As Nathan points out, like New Orleans a few other places have issues with current sea level. I imagine in 1900 people were paying to improve sea defences in various places. And in 1800.
I’m picturing a cost curve rising more rapidly than sea level. When sea level has risen 0.1m the costs are $B. When sea level has risen 0.25m the costs are $B x 3, at 0.5m $B x 10 and if we hit 1.0m $B x 40. It’s my mental picture.
I’m sure someone has done some more sums, but it’s hard to tease out the data I need to validate my mental picture from the various papers I’ve read. If instead it is nice and linear let me know.
2. Sea level rise in the upper bound, if it occurs, will occur mostly later.
Following on from the above, I also have the mental model that thermal expansion of the ocean follows a reasonably predictable path, that has some linearity, and is dependent on temperature. By contrast, the addition of mass to the ocean by melting glaciers, the Greenland ice sheet and the west Antarctic ice sheet is quite unpredictable.
If almost no “land ice” melts then the impacts are well down. Sea level for RCP6.5 will be something like 0.4m in 2100. If so, apart from a few places, and excluding the “to be discussed” storm surges, it is probably quite manageable.
If lots of “land ice” melts then the extra sea level is unknown, because of the non-linearity of ice sheet melting, and is likely to occur much closer to the end of the century (my arbitrary time point only because we are looking at the impacts to 2100).
So point 1 + point 2 = a yet steeper cost curve to 2100 (if there is a high cost).
3. “Locked in sea level rise”
If the entire world stopped emitted GHGs tomorrow sea level would still rise for a while and Miami would still have exactly the same problems as under our current extravagant days until sometime like 2050. Again, I’m not sure of the decade and I’m sure different models give different answers.
Point 3 added to previous points again steepen the curve (when considering mitigation, see point 4) towards 2100.
4. Relevance and Planning vs Mitigation
If we are simply trying to do some sums so various levels of government can get their best guess for current and future planning on improving coastal defences then my points have about zero impact.
Because of course, people are incurring some costs now, like in 1900.
I’m not.
I’m considering the big subject of “the social cost of carbon” and the cost benefit analysis of rapid reductions in CO2 (and other GHG) emissions versus kicking back and versus something inbetween.
I probably should have made all that clear, that’s the great thing about writing an article, it’s not only your ideas that get tested but also the clarity of your writing.
As with examining climate science, I believe in testing ideas and subjecting them to analysis. And putting forward and defending alternative hypotheses.
For many people it is completely clear that urgent action is needed now. (To be written in capitals).
For others, it is completely clear that nothing whatever should be done.
Instead of slogans and tribal warfare, I think examining the case point by point is a good idea.
SOD
I can see your point. However, the mitigation costs also include ‘features’ beyond addressing sea level rise; less pollution etc. and Possibly cheaper energy in the future. The mitigation will also help those away from the coast.
Also
“If you ask today’s citizens to pay a current cost to mitigate a future cost that will affect few living today”
People in Florida are already paying for it. So the impacts will affect people living today and they are already paying for it.
So this discussion is not really about the impacts; as you haven’t really looked at them beyond a sea level rise number (x mm/year) and the anticipated cost of addressing the sea level rise. This post is more about the politics, and how would you sell or not sell the mitigation.
Nathan,
People who, by choice, live in Florida should be paying for it. The question, however, is should people who live in other states at higher elevation also be paying for it. I don’t think so. The same goes for construction in flood plains.
And people in Bangladesh? we just say screw them?
Nathan,
Nice deflection.
In a word, yes. As long as China continues to increase carbon emissions faster than the rest of the world can cut them (not that anyone is doing all that much), nothing we do will have a significant effect on Bangladesh. Sea level rise for the next few decades is already baked in the cake.
The lawyers will probably eviscerate this. The SLR that is currently damaging Florida, and that will significantly damage Florida in the future, has a cause, and 49 states share a mountain of blame versus Florida’s molehill.
JCH,
Nobody held a gun to peoples’ heads and made them move to the Florida coast. If you want to charge someone, try China. The rest of the country is a molehill compared to China. In 2014, China was responsible for 29.6% of global carbon emissions, nearly twice that of the US. Absent a collapse of the Chinese economy, which might actually happen, it will continue to increase. Carbon emissions from India, currently the fourth highest emitter, are also increasing rapidly.
That graphic was for China. India looks about the same, but at a lower level at the moment. Meanwhile, thanks to things like fracking, US emissions are flat to down thanks to things like cheap natural gas from fracking.
Nathan Tetlaw wrote: “And people in Bangladesh? we just say screw them?”
Restricting CO2 emissions will do little for the people of Bangladesh. If we want to help them, we should help them to adapt and to grow their economy,
Nathan Tetlaw wrote: “People in Florida are already paying for it.”
It is not at all clear that they are paying for effects of climate change, rather than for the effects of imprudent decisions as to where to build.
DeWitt wisely asks who *should* pay. I would put that somewhat differently. Any course of action chosen, be it mitigation or adoption or doing nothing at all, will produce relative winners and relative losers.
With mitigation the losers will be mostly poor people. That is because lifting people out of poverty requires economic growth and growth requires energy. Making energy more expensive will slow growth and make it harder for people to escape poverty. With respect to sea level change, the winners from mitigation will be people with ocean front property. I’d rather help the poor people.
Of course attribution is difficult, which cigarette caused the cancer and all… but given that sea level is rising; we know that thermal expansion causes it; we know that we’re causing the heating of the oceans… I think we can assume it’s due to global warming…
Mitigation won’t cause poor people to be any poorer. Would depend on the taxation system in place to do the mitigation. Generally taxation systems are progressive and most Carbon Tax systems are designed to be revenue neutral; so wealthy people pay more and the poor are subsidised for the costs
The ‘cost’ of energy is not simply the price people pay per kWh. You have to internalise the external costs to get the real price, else all those ocean front property people are subsidising you higher altitude folk.
Nathan Tetlaw wrote: “given that sea level is rising; we know that thermal expansion causes it; we know that we’re causing the heating of the oceans… I think we can assume it’s due to global warming…”
The point I made has nothing to do with attribution. I know of no evidence that the 7 or 8 cm of sea level rise due to thermal expansion from anthropogenic warming is causing significant damage in Florida.
Nathan Tetlaw wrote: “Mitigation won’t cause poor people to be any poorer. Would depend on the taxation system … the poor are subsidised for the costs”.
That is pie-in-the-sky thinking. Increased energy costs will slow economic growth and that will harm poor people. It is cruel to subsidize poor people while denying them the chance to become not poor.
Nathan Tetlaw wrote: “The ‘cost’ of energy is not simply the price people pay per kWh. You have to internalise the external costs to get the real price”
I agree. But it is not clear if the external cost is even positive, let alone sufficient to pay for the cost of mitigation. And you must do the same for other sources of energy.
But you still need to do the work, and so far when people attempt it almost universally they come back to a Carbon Tax as there are costs to bear. There needs to be a system to factor that cost into the price.
Nathan: “The ‘cost’ of energy is not simply the price people pay per kWh. You have to internalize the EXTERNAL COSTS [my emphasis] to get the real price, else all those ocean front property people are subsidizing you higher altitude folk.”
That is great in theory. Now, who can we trust to fairly and accurately calculate those external costs? A committee led by someone picked by President Trump with the advice of Rick Perry (Texas oil) and Scott Pruitt (Oklahoma oil) and perhaps Republican-soon-to-be Joe Manchin (WV coal)? A committee that will be over-ruled by acolytes of President Warren in four years?
As SOD points out, should these committees count the damage in the distant future to people who have been making stupid investments in vulnerable areas? There would be thousands of ambiguous decisions to be made about both costs and benefits. Does anyone remember the days of President Ford’s wage and price controls, when Don Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney set prices for every product, job ior service in the US?
Or should we accept the judgment of the committee appointed by Obama to set a social cost for carbon for the EPA? For cost-benefit analysis, they chose to count the WORLDWIDE benefits of reducing CO2 emissions against costs paid only by Americans. And a dubious discount rate.
My point is that these “external costs” are impossible to assess in a manner that can be understood and accepted by most Americans. Such an assessment of external costs belongs in the realm of POLITICS, not carefully selected economists and other “experts” meeting behind closed doors. If our elected representatives want to put a “consumption tax” on fossil fuels to pay for Trump’s otherwise-unaffordable spending plans and tax cuts, that might make economic and political sense (whether ECS is high or low).
Frank,
A lot of different people have calculated a cost of carbon, with some assumptions out in the open (maybe all).
For example, in The Social Cost of Carbon: Trends, Outliers and Catastrophes, by the famous Richard SJ Tol (2007) –
[Emphasis added]
And in the conclusion:
– Anyway, all for further review, probably around part MCXXVII or thereabouts.
Frank it may be difficult, but people have attempted it. Not sure I would share the love for Richard Tol… As for trust, nothing I say is going to make trust anyone but the fact remains that without it carbon-based energy is being subsidised.
Nathan Tetlaw wrote: “it may be difficult, but people have attempted it. … the fact remains that without it carbon-based energy is being subsidised.”
There is no such “fact”. From what I have seen on the topic, the present social cost is negative; that is, the users of fossil fuels are subsidizing everybody else. The studies do show the cost eventually becoming positive. If memory serves, the minimum (most negative) cost is achieved somewhat short of 2 K warming and the total cost becomes positive around or just above 2 K. Since we are unlikely to reach 2 K, the social cost of carbon would appear to be very small.
I think the above behavior results because some costs are linear in temperature anomaly and some are quadratic. The former, which dominate for a small change, tend to be benefits. The latter are things where we have built infrastructure that is matched to current conditions (the location of seaports is based on present sea level), so a large change in either direction is a problem.
NIce DeWitt
It’s not a deflection. Basically your lifestyle and cheap power are being subsidised by the poor of places like Bangladesh. You may moan and whine about a $10 per week increase to the cost of living, but at present this cost i being borne by others.
Anyway you should consider that the largest volume of emissions have come from the US, China may have just exceeded the US on a yearly basis bu tthe cumulative volume is largely European and the US.
Nathan,
That might be true now, but it won’t be true much longer. Much of the carbon emitted in the past has already been absorbed. The statement that about half of all annual emissions are absorbed immediately is not true. Very little is absorbed in the first year. The rest of the absorption is from carbon dioxide that’s already in the atmosphere. In 2005, about half the excess CO2 in the atmosphere had been emitted in the previous 20 years.
You also need to subtract the carbon absorbed by US forests, currently a significant carbon sink, that absorbs the equivalent of 10-20% of annual US carbon emissions. One of my objections to the Kyoto Protocol was that the US was not allowed to count this carbon sink.
You should also include the contribution to atmospheric CO2 from land use/land cover changes. That amounts to somewhat over 30% of the excess CO2 in the atmosphere. Given that the US, Europe and China were land use carbon sinks in 2005, almost all of that was from Tropical America, Tropical Africa and Tropical Asia.
Dewitt
This is all very complex accounting, I agree. You also have to consider that the impacts we are currently experiencing are due to emissions from some time ago – we’re not yet in equilibrium. You also have to consider that by emitting so much in the past you are depriving the third world of free emissions as the US had for some time. Another cost for them to bear.
It’s very complex, and dismissing the costs to those other people as part of ‘poor planning’ on their behalf because they chose to live by the sea is too simplistic to be useful.
Your power is being subsidised by people who bear the impacts of the resultant emissions. It’s pretty clear.
Nathan wrote: “Anyway you should consider that the largest volume of emissions have come from the US, China may have just exceeded the US on a yearly basis bu tthe cumulative volume is largely European and the US.”
Your information is somewhat out of date and misses the explosion of CO2 emissions that will be coming from developing countries in the next century.
China’s emissions equalled those of the US in 2005 and doubled over the next decade. If the US had eliminated all CO2 emissions, China’s growth in emissions would have negated that effort in one decade. If not for their severe financial problems today, their emissions would be triple the US by 2030 (based on their estimates for growth and improved energy efficiency). Extrapolating from the data in wikipedia, China’s CUMULATIVE emissions will surpass those of the US and the EU in about 10 years.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_carbon_dioxide_emissions
Of course, there are many more people in China than the US. Nevertheless, Chinese per capita emissions are now higher than the EU.
There are another 4 billion people in the developing and underdeveloped world who are desperate to follow in China’s footsteps – especially in India. The old worst-case A1F1 emissions scenario was jokingly called the “golden age” by economists, because its projections were based on the assumption that most people would become as well off as the average Chinese today, mostly by burning cheap coal (like the Chinese have).
You can find some data and graphs at the link below, but this source is out of date, overestimates emissions in developed countries and underestimates.
http://www.theenergycollective.com/jemiller_ep/156431/draft-can-developed-countries-reduce-future-total-world-carbon-emissions
Hi SOD
In the Stern report sea wall defense costs rise as x^2
I hope I haven’t come across as antagonistic – not my aim. It’s just that these couple of posts seemed to lack the rigor that I normally enjoy in your writing.
“If almost no “land ice” melts then the impacts are well down. Sea level for RCP6.5 will be something like 0.4m in 2100. If so, apart from a few places, and excluding the “to be discussed” storm surges, it is probably quite manageable.”
The issue I have with this is that the impact of a 0.4m sea level rise hasn’t really been explored; it certainly sounds like a small number, but what does it mean? I have made an attempt at understanding over the last few days, but haven’t found much other than reports about specific locations. It’s a hellishly complicated issue.
Nathan,
Not at all. Questions and challenges are welcome. As the Etiquette says:
I appreciate that I appear to have some rigor in other writing. It is easy with physics.
I can make a statement about physics that is true, false, unclear, possibly true, subject to more research.. and anyone with any sense about science can dig into the details and reach similar conclusions.
We can do controlled experiments. We can examine the results from theory. We can compare the two. We can assess the uncertainty.
In economics, none of the above is clear. (And I read a lot of economists).
Lots of economics seems to me to be form and no substance. Just because you added up some numbers and applied a discount rate doesn’t tell us anything about its real value and there is just about no way to address the inherent uncertainties.
That’s not because economics is “wrong”. It is because real life is complicated, uncertain, and hard to measure. Economics is one facet of that real life, and while you can put some numbers into economics equations, that often doesn’t reveal anything.
Economics can assign a number to something but it often has little meaning – economists often tell us why and caution on interpretation, but non-economists usually just take the number(s) and use it. Numbers seem solid and factual.
And so, believing as I do in questioning everything (where time permits and interest lies) it makes perfect sense to me to challenge 2100 costs as being meaningless even if they (amazingly) turned out to be actually the right $ value.
Nathan: IMO, it is perfectly sensible to advocate for a Pigou tax to counterbalance the negative externalities associated with a particular business. However, I think it is misleading (and perhaps deceptive) to call the absence of a Pigou tax a “subsidy”. According to Wikipedia:
“A subsidy is a form of financial aid or support extended to an economic sector (or institution, business, or individual) generally with the aim of promoting economic and social policy. Although commonly extended from government, the term subsidy can relate to any type of support – for example from NGOs or as implicit subsidies. Subsidies come in various forms including: direct (cash grants, interest-free loans) and indirect (tax breaks, insurance, low-interest loans, accelerated depreciation, rent rebates).”
When term subsidy is used, the general public certainly thinks in terms of some sort of reduced taxation or direct payment, but liberal newspapers quote economic studies that include the absence of a Pigou tax as a subsidy without explanation. Furthermore, AFAIK, no government actually imposes any Pigovian taxes determined solely by economic analysis. There are no Pigouvian taxes on other power sources. Finally, as I pointed out above, the analysis is so complicated and ambiguous that it is political, not economic.
Frank you misinterpreted what I said before when saying the US and Europe had more emissions. You need to look at the cumulative sum of the last hundred years or so, not just year by year comparisons. The CO2 level we have is a cumulative sum, and we’re not in equilibrium yet.
I don’t think getting all semantic about whether an external cost paid by someone is a subsidy to the non-payer is useful.
It still means the power price you pay is less than it would be if all costs were included.
I am happy where this discussion went, though. At least now people are talking about the external costs and who should pay and how, rather than saying that coastal folk should pay as they bought there and that they’ll be dead so the cost will be zero….
Nathan Tetlaw wrote: “The CO2 level we have is a cumulative sum, and we’re not in equilibrium yet.”
No, it is not. Much of the older emissions have been drawn out into the ocean and biosphere. A much larger fraction of recent emissions is in the atmosphere, so recent emissions should be weighted more heavily.
Nathan wrote: “I don’t think getting all semantic about whether an external cost paid by someone is a subsidy to the non-payer is useful.”
It really does not matter since the external cost of CO2 emissions is negligible. There are other external costs with fossil fuels, just as there are for wind and solar. Present costs, and present value of future costs, for sea level rise are near zero. There may be future costs, but in the U.S. (which this article was about), those costs should be taken into account by people who buy coastal property, so it is proper that they should bear such costs.
Just an historical aside, why new Orleans? The answer is because all the businesses and people and communities, the vast interior population of much of the United States, simply had to have it. Initially they, some of them anyway, needed New Orleans in order to reach the interior. Once there, no outlet and inlet would have strangled their economy. So New Orleans grew and grew and grew… because the interior of the nation demanded that a huge number of businesses and services and laborers be present right where big ships could be loaded and unloaded right next to the big services needed to do that. At one point New Orleans was one of the largest cities in the country. Its population has actually shrunk considerably. In part, I suspect, because of Houston. Why Houston? The place is nasty.
Mike M
“No, it is not. Much of the older emissions have been drawn out into the ocean and biosphere. ”
? What sort of logic is this?
Prior to the Industrial revolution it was largely unchanging over century time scales. We’ve added 130ppm in about 200 years. It’s ALL come from Humans.
“It really does not matter since the external cost of CO2 emissions is negligible.”
This is not true; there are endless attempts at determining the extenal cost and they’re not zero – unless you like Richard Tol.
And if you think they are zero, why are you opposed to a tax that would factor it in.
People are paying now, for CO2 impacts, generated by other people.
Sorry Mike M
Misread what you wrote:
“No, it is not. Much of the older emissions have been drawn out into the ocean and biosphere. ”
Do the sums. China has only exceeded the US for the last few years, the US has emitted way more in the years it was ahead of China.
Click to access navigating_numbers_chapter6.pdf
more than half the total emissions since 1850 have come from the US and Europe.
Those earlier emissions may have been absorbed faster into the oceans and biosphere, but it is for exactly that reason that emissions build up faster now. Modern emissions reside longer in the atmosphere because the ability of the oceans and biosphere to absorb it is now diminished. This is the fault of the US and Europe.
Nathan Tetlaw: “And if you think they are zero, why are you opposed to a tax that would factor it in.”
I have no objection to a tax of $0 per ton. I do object to an arbitrary, inflated, politically motivated carbon tax. The whole theory of Pigovian tax assumes the ability to objectively determine the cost of externalities. Even Pigou recognized that as a serious problem with the theory. We certainly can not do that for a carbon tax. With current knowledge, we can’t even make a reasonable approximation.
Nathan Tetlaw: “China has only exceeded the US for the last few years, the US has emitted way more in the years it was ahead of China.”
I do not deny that. At present, even a properly weighted average probably has the U.S. ahead of China. But that won’t last long. By the time the net cost of increased CO2 exceeds the net benefit (if that ever happens), China will be well ahead. It is not just Richard Tol. Almost all the economics analyses show the same pattern, they just put the minimum at different places.
Nathan Tetlaw: “it is for exactly that reason that emissions build up faster now. Modern emissions reside longer in the atmosphere because the ability of the oceans and biosphere to absorb it is now diminished.”
That is just plain contrary to fact.
Nathan wrote: “Frank you misinterpreted what I said before when saying the US and Europe had more emissions. You need to look at the cumulative sum of the last hundred years or so, not just year by year comparisons. The CO2 level we have is a cumulative sum, and we’re not in equilibrium yet.”
We don’t have data for the past 100 years or so. Wikipedia has cumulative data back to 1970. On that basis, China’s CUMULATIVE EMISSIONS will exceed those of the US in about 13 years and the EU in about 3 years. In 1970, CO2 was about 325 ppm, which is about 1/3 the way from 285 ppm to today’s 400 ppm. I”m not sure how to divide up responsibility for the last 1/3.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_carbon_dioxide_emissions
The best way to assign responsibility would be to start when the world first realized that CO2 might be a problem – 1990. The Kyoto accords used 1990 emissions as a baseline – but the undeveloped countries of the world (along with the US) refused to take any responsibility. In terms of cumulative emissions since 1990, China is already in the lead. While the US’s energy infrastructure has been slowly replacing since 1990 in a way that reduces CO2 emissions somewhat (more natural gas, some wind), China has deliberately chosen the worst possible course of development (including air pollution) when building from a low baseline, knowing what was at stake. All of the coal plants they have built will be online for the next 30+ years. Their renewable power is a modest fraction, even though they were building a totally new facilities. And their development has resulted in very poor inefficiency compared with the US, especial in terms of GDP/CO2 or per capita GDP/CO2. (The Paris Summit was a disappointment to some because India reserved the right to follow China’s development pathway unless developed companies paid a huge sum to cover the extra cost of renewable power.) Poor countries will insist on being paid the extra cost of developing via mostly renewable power and developed democracies trying to reduce their emissions are unlikely to pay.
There are many different ways to apportion responsibility and none are particularly reliable. Try to look from all perspectives, not just the one being sold by the left. The reason no one is on track to cut emissions in half by 2030 is that it is very expensive. In foreign policy, the “realists” believe diplomacy is a zero-sum game, without win-win scenarios. No one is willing to accept a disadvantage. The US is richer, but losing jobs to China (the rising power that provides the greatest threat).
In US law, treaties approved by 2/3rd of the Senate rank above regular laws passed by Congress. If the US were to sign a binding treaty on GHGs, it would be enforced by the courts no matter what Congress decided to do afterwards. So a binding treaty is a much bigger commitment for the US than other countries that can change their mind. A binding treaty with easy ways out aren’t very useful. The US invests in renewables, China doesn’t and gets out when it fails to meet its commitments. Or vice versa. So negotiators are stuck with voluntary “intended national commitments to reduce CO2 with no enforcement or penalties.
Frank,
I have carbon emissions data going back to 1750 through 2005. It includes estimates of emissions from land use/land cover changes from 1850 on. If pressed, I could probably find the source.
Nathan,
Total carbon emissions from fossil fuels from 1750 to 2005 were 321PgC and land use/land cover changes from 1850-2005 added 155PgC for a total of 476PgC. If the pre-industrial equilibrium level of CO2 was 285 ppmv and there are 2.13 PgC/ppmv, then in 2005 when the atmospheric CO2 level was 380 ppmv CO2, that accounts for (380-285)*2.13/476 = 43% of the total carbon emitted. The rest has been absorbed by the biosphere and the oceans. There is zero evidence that the rate of uptake has slowed. The above may not include CO2 from cement manufacture. That would increase the percentage uptake.
In 2005, I fitted a simple function to the historical CO2 data from Muana Loa. The calculated value for 2016 was less than 1 ppmv lower than the preliminary measured value. The recent El Nino caused a spike in the year over year change, so I’m confident that the fit is still good.
Mike M
“I do object to an arbitrary, inflated, politically motivated carbon tax.”
this is your problem here.
You are assuming it’s politically motivated.
Nathan,
Your problem is that you assume that it isn’t politically motivated at all. The Kyoto Protocol was, for example, designed to punish the US compared to Europe. That’s why it was rejected. If you can’t admit that, there is little to discuss.
A Pigovian tax on carbon emissions that doesn’t transfer money to, say, Bangladesh, would be nearly pointless. The probability of such a transfer being passed by a US Congress is vanishingly small. That’s politics.
DeWitt
“The Kyoto Protocol was, for example, designed to punish the US compared to Europe.”
Why would I ‘admit’ that? There is no evidence of it… and punish for what? emitting more CO2?
“The probability of such a transfer being passed by a US Congress is vanishingly small. That’s politics.”
No it’s because people, such as yourselves, won’t vote for it.
Because you see it as punishment. .
as I said before at least you’ve moved beyond the simplistic and have embraced the complex.
Nathan,
Go back and look at the history of the Kyoto Protocol in detail, particularly the Byrd-Hagel resolution, and come back when you can comment on it intelligently. The Byrd-Hagel resolution passed 95-0.
Your question should be punish how, not punish for what? If you answer that question correctly, you might begin to understand, but I doubt it.
You have embraced the simplistic and ignored the complex.
DeWitt: From the UNFCCC synthesis report, paragraph 34:
“the growth [in global emissions] is expected to slow down substantially, to 11–23 per cent in the 2010–2030 period compared with 24 per cent in the 1990–2010 period.
In other word, under Kyoto – with binding targets for about a dozen developed nations and good intentions from the rest of the world – emissions grew 24% from 2010. Under Paris – with non-binding INDCs volunteered by most major emitters – emissions will grow almost as fast, 11-23%, between 2010 and 2030.
The wide range is because many nations stated intentions to reduce emissions per unit GDP. However, the cynical will recognize that slow GDP growth will be the perfect excuses for a nation’s changing its goals. So adding the less developed nations to the weaker Paris Agreement isn’t likely to slow the rate of emissions growth appreciably.
Only about 30% of the “pledged” reductions are actual reductions in emissions The rest is estimated reductions in growth of emission under business as usual (50%) and related “reductions” in emissions growth. So I can’t see that anything has been changed appreciably by the addition of 150 additional countries. (Which is not surprising. The issue has been on the table for two decades.)
Click to access 07.pdf
Frank,
Roger Pielke, Jr. pointed out years ago, The Climate Fix (2010) for example, that decarbonizing economies was not fast, easy or inexpensive and mostly wasn’t happening. For that and other things he was labelled a climate change d3ni3r and threatened with legal action. He decided that being an Honest Broker was too much trouble and moved on to other things.
Review at Amazon
DeWitt:
Didn’t know much about The Climate Fix. I was confronted by some unreasonable optimism about the Paris Agreements and the claim that revolutionary developments are making major change practical. That is when I found the 1990-2010 vs 2010-2030 comparison of emissions growth.
Most of the “revolutionary developments” were totally bogus, but I wondered about electricity vehicles (and hybrids). They might someday be a revolution if batteries were cheap enough. (With about $1,000/yr for gasoline, even free and rapid electrical “fill ups” won’t induce many to spend $10,000 for a battery.) Charging a battery with electricity from natural gas can cut CO2 emissions by about 50% vs gasoline (or any other fossil fuel, possibly even hydrogen from natural gas), but electricity from coal increases emissions of CO2 (and traditional pollutants). Gasoline produces about 20% of CO2 emissions. So EVs probably won’t have much of an impact without a lower carbon grid. Nuclear output is beginning to fall, so we probably won’t have a lower carbon grid by 2030. So even the most optimist assumptions about a revolution in EVs won’t produce much of a change.
Removing coal from the grid could make a big difference, with or without EVs.
There has been a revolutionary change in that area that climate activists rarely mention – fracking. Natural gas is much cheaper than renewables, currently cheaper than coal, dispatchable, and releases much less traditional pollution and CO2.
Frank,
Some Stanford based economist recently claimed that fossil fuel powered cars wouldn’t be manufactured after 2024. IMO, that’s magical thinking and I put it where I put most economists’ predictions. A friend of mine commented that the economist probably rode a bicycle to work and had never spent any time in a truly rural area.
DeWitt,
I wonder if the economist was hypothesizing that all cars built after 2024 would be electric, OR, that all cars built after 2024 would be electric AND all electricity production after 2024 would be from renewables or nuclear.
As of today if you buy an electric car it is still powered by the current electricity grid, and therefore is mostly powered by fossil fuel burning. Probably most people who buy an electric car today don’t register this, so at least for them it’s money well spent on warm fuzzy feelings, and of course, in pushing the engineering and economics of electric car manufacturing forward (so it’s not a 100% investment in warm fuzzy feelings).
Discussing magical thinking, DeWitt wrote: “Some Stanford based economist recently claimed that fossil fuel powered cars wouldn’t be manufactured after 2024.”
This rate of change implies dramatic improvement in cost and technology. An EV with a $2000 battery and a 500 mile range that can be charged in an hour or less* (while eating a meal) would displace conventional cars. Doesn’t the market cap of Tesla Motors reflect such [magical] thinking?
*This is roughly what a Tesla Supercharging station provides today, reportedly at a cost of about $15K per charger. According to the link below, annual surface parking costs are about $1000/space (and multi-level structures cost above 3-4X more). Adding a charging station with a 15-year life would double a restaurant owner’s parking cost at today’s price. Magical thinking?
Click to access tca0504.pdf
My point was that EVs aren’t any “greener” than the electrical grid that fuels them. Even change this dramatic won’t contribute much towards Obama’s goal of a 25% reduction in CO2 by 2030. A greener grid based on wind and solar is magical thinking without much higher cost and a breakthrough in power storage. Natural gas in the short term and nuclear in the long term could deliver a greener grid. The magical thinkers don’t want to think about these options.
Expanding 20th-century nuclear technology – which has experienced about one serious incident per decade – may also be magical thinking. The regulatory cost of building a new design is currently astronomical. 10-operating years of experience with a new design isn’t much of a safety record. 100-operating years would require a national commitment. After more than a half-century, fuel rods made of something besides zirconium – which reacts with water to make hydrogen at operating temperature – may be magical thinking. Reprocessing long-lived radioactive materials and using them for fuel would help the disposal problem, but might complicate safety. The free market can sometimes make magical thinking become reality, but probably not in the field of nuclear power.
Here’s a news article:
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2017-05/16/content_29358137.htm
Here’s a link to a video by the author of a talk on the subject:
In a dense urban environment, car ownership is already uneconomic. In Manhattan, only 23% of households own a car. That doesn’t mean that it’s uneconomic in, say, Fargo, ND or the surrounding community, or will be in only seven years. Or, for that matter, that battery powered cars, much less self-driving cars, will be practical and economic in rural areas in seven years.
I didn’t mean to hijack the thread. This is getting rather far from the original post.
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